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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMICS THAT
CHALLENGE CHICAGO SCHOOL VIEWS
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
A powerful storm swept through antitrust law during the 1970s. Prece-
dent after precedent was limited or overturned.' Now the skies have
cleared and the landscape has changed. In every direction, the new world
of antitrust looks remarkably like the south side of Chicago.'
Supporters of the new approach now seek to institutionalize Chicago
School thinking, in order to foreclose the possibility of a return to the
antitrust interpretation of the 1960s. 3 But critical voices are also being
heard. Some suggest that antitrust should prohibit transfers of wealth
from consumers to producers,4 or otherwise inform antitrust interpreta-
* Assistant Professor, Amos Tuck School, Dartmouth College. The author is grateful to
Steven C. Salop for helpful discussions.
' The landmark decisions include United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486 (1974) (relaxing the presumption of anticompetitive effect arising from high concentra-
tion); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1967) (overruling tie per
se illegality standard applied in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1977) and testing nonprice vertical restraints under the rule of reason); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (requiring a private plaintiff to demon-
strate that his injury flowed from a practice proscribed under the antitrust laws); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (testing a horizontal restraint under the rule of reason
because efficiencies were large); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975)
(incorporating supply substitution into market definition), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975).
Other important decisions in the Chicago School antitrust revolution were handed dtown
in the 1980s. E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(dismissing an economically irrational complaint on a motion for summary judgment);
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (limiting the application
of the longstanding per se prohibition against resale price maintenance); United States v.
Waste Mgt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (market power cannot be exercised when
entry is easy, regardless of concentration).
2 Alternative explanations for the rise of the Chicago School are evaluated in Baker,
Book Review, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming) (reviewing EcONOMICS AND ANTrIRUST I'OLICY
(R. Larner & J. Meehan 1989)).
" See, e.g., American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Report to the House of
Delegates on Proposed Amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 ANITrRUS'T L.J. 673
(1986) (evaluating the Reagan Administration's 1986 proposal to codify recent merger
enforcement policy through legislation).
' See e.g., Lande, Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should
Guide Antitrust, supra this issue, at 631. Lande concedes a great deal to the Chicago School.
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tion with values beyond the goal of economic efficiency emphasized in
Chicago.
Through the influence of the Chicago School, economics has become
the essence of antitrust.' But no one believes that economic knowledge
was certified as complete on the day Professor Stigler was awarded the
Nobel Prize. Accordingly, this article describes six new developments in
economics that qualify or limit traditional Chicago School conclusions.7
These developments demonstrate that we need not reject the value of
economic efficiency in order to question the Chicago School. These chal-
lenges to Chicago arise from within the efficiency paradigm.'
HIe employs economic concepts and terminology. He also frames his fundamental claim,
that buyers have an entitlement to the consumers' surplus accruing under perfect competi-
lion, in terms that students of Ronald Coase will best appreciate: as a property right. That
l.ande would state his critique this way suggests the extent to which the Chicago School has
come to dominate mainstream antitrust thinking.
An exclusive focus on consumers' surplus is particularly appealing in two situations. First,
in some industries, the producers' surplus accrues mainly to foreign producers while the
consumers' surplus accrues primarily to domestic buyers. (This might occur in markets for
imported products in which a competitive domestic distribution sector acts largely as an
order taker rather than as a supplier of point of sale services valued by consumers.) Second,
if wealth transfers to producers are routinely dissipated in wasteful rent seeking, as some
Chicago commentators argue, then there may be little difference in practical result between
the suggestion that antitrust should seek to maximize consumers' surplus and the Chicago
position that antitrust should seek to maximize aggregate surplus.
5 E.g., Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust Retrospective and Perspective: Where Are We Coming Front?
Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987).
" In the enforcement agencies and the courts, antitrust cases now turn almost exclusively
on a detailed analysis of the efficiency consequences of firm behavior. Moreover, antitrust
has largely adopted the conclusions about the economic effects of business practices reached
by Jludge Bork and Judge Posner over a decade ago. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
1978 (drafted during 1968 and 1969); R. POSNER, ANTIrRUST LAW (1976). But see Gellhorn,
The Practical Uses 01Economic Analysis: Hope vs. Reality, 56 ANTrrRusr L.J. 933 (1988) (arguing
that economics has to date been more influential in the enforcement agencies than in the
courts).
7 Some new developments support rather than challenge Chicago positions. One exam-
pie comes from the economics of non-price vertical restraints. For Richard Posner, following
in argument originally made by Chicago economist Lester Telser, these restraints are
efficient primarily because they limit the incentive of low service "discount" sellers to free
ride on the reputational investments of full service dealers. R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 147-
48 (1976); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3J.L. & EcON. 86 (1960). But
this interpretation has difficulty explaining why manufacturers of products not requiring
substantial point of sale services desire vertical restraints. More recently, economists have
pointed out that some vertical restraints have efficiency motivations other than limiting
free riding by discounters. Manufacturers may choose not to sell through discounters in
order to signal high quality to consumers, thereby remedying a potential adverse selection
problem. See, e.g., Oster, Levi Strauss, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION VERTICAL RESTRAINT CASES 48 (R. Lafferty, R. Lande, &J. Kirkwood 1984) (blue jeans
manufacturer avoided distributing its product through discount stores in order to signal
high quality).
Most of these challenges reflect insights gained through the application of game theory,
the primary post-Chicago development in theoretical industrial organization economics.
See Shapiro, The Theory of Bu.iness Strategy, 20 RAND J. ECON. 125 (1989).
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I. VERTICAL FORECLOSURE THAT RAISES RIVALS' COSTS
The most widely publicized new development involves the economics
of vertical foreclosure. Judge Bork insists that competition is never
harmed when a firm asks its suppliers not to sell to its rivals; the rivals
will merely shift their orders to competing suppliers. Hence whenever
firms employ vertical foreclosure to pursue private advantage, whether
through merger or contract, they are invariably pursuing social efficien-
cies as well, according to this view.'
The new economic literature on raising rivals' costs provides an anti-
competitive explanation for the same practice."' Suppose, for example,
Crest bought the rights to be the only toothpaste sold by the leading
supermarket chains in New England. The other toothpaste manufactur-
ers would be unable to reach their customers except through convenience
stores, drug stores, and small groceries. Suppose further that these alter-
native outlets are less convenient for most customers than supermarkets.
Colgate and other brands would now have higher distribution costs.
Accordingly, they would be forced to reduce output, just as they would
if they colluded with Crest voluntarily." Even if Crest did not change its
own output, industry output would decline, and the industry price would
rise above competitive levels.'"
9 Judge Bork concluded that the FTC can cure any competitive problem that may result
from vertical foreclosure "by throwing an industry social mixer" at which rivals can meet
competing suppliers. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 232 (1978).
'0 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power
overPrice, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Ordover, Saloner & Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure,
AM. EcoN. REV. (forthcoming); Salinger, The Meaning of"Upstream" and "Downstream" and
the Implicationsfor Modeling Vertical Mergers, 37 J. INDUS. EcoN. 373 (1989); Baker, Vertical
Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers that Raise Rivals' Costs, 14 AM. J.L.
& MED. 147 (1988); Salop & Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36J. INoUS. EcoN. 19 (1987);
Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. EcoN.
85 (1968).
While Bork recognizes one form of the raising rivals' costs logic, which he terms disrup-
tion of distribution patterns, he argues that anticompetitive outcomes are implausible
and that courts cannot reliably distinguish between procompetitive and anticompetitive
exclusionary practices. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 49, 156, 242. Non-price predation can
only be successful, in Bork's view, when the predator enlists the government. Id. at 159,
347-64. Accordingly, Bork concludes that vertical arrangements should be held legal per
se. Id. at 29, 226.
" This description emphasizes that a raising rivals' costs case can be viewed as an "involun-
tary cartel." The predator would like to collude with its rivals, but fears that they will
cheat on any voluntary agreement to reduce output. Instead, the predator uses vertical
foreclosure to increase its competitors' costs. The cost increase forces the rival sellers to
reduce their output, much as they would if they colluded voluntarily with the predator.
1 Whether this strategy is profitable for Colgate depends upon its costs of obtaining the
exclusionary right and upon the size of the resulting increase in the market price.
19891
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This anticompetitive explanation for foreclosure is as rigorous as the
familiar efficiency explanations for vertical practices 3 and has already
begun to influence antitrust practice. The FTC included a raising rivals'
costs count in its complaint challenging the Coke-Dr Pepper merger.14
Judge Frank Easterbrook, whose Chicago School orientation is well
known, has taken the new theory seriously. 5 Although raising rivals'
costs claims fell on deaf ears at the Antitrust Division in the Reagan
Administration, 6 newly appointed officials at the Justice Department
may come to have a different point of view.
II. THE NEW ECONOMICS OF PRICE PREDATION
The second new development is the new economics of predatory pric-
ing. The Chicago view is that charging prices below cost is irrational,
because a predator cannot reasonably expect to recoup its initial losses
from price predation. 7 Chicago commentators reason that the initial
losses may persist for a long time and, even if a predator induces its rivals
" Economists criticizing the Chicago School view of vertical restraints also have pointed
out that there is no reason to expect competing firms selling differentiated products to
select the welfare-maximizing balance between achieving scale economies (pushing toward
a small number of brands or few retailer services) and serving consumers better through
increased product variety (pushing toward a large number of brands or large variety of
retailer services). The potential market failure arises because optimal product variety
depends in part upon the strength of the preferences of inframarginal (brand loyal)
consumers, but firms respond to the behavior of marginal (non-brand loyal) consumers.
See, e.g., Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust
Policy, 98 HARv. L. REV. 983 (1985); cf. Mankiw & Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,
17 RAND J. ECON. 48 (1986) (inefficiencies in competitive markets with fixed set-up costs).
Although this criticism is valid, it is difficult empirically to identify industries in which
consumer welfare would be improved were firms to offer a different set of products (or,
equivalently, a different set of point of sale services). Accordingly, it may be beyond our
current economic competence to prosecute firms under the antitrust laws for, in effect,
selling the wrong brands (or offering the wrong retailer services). But see Scherer, The
Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 704 (1983) (vertical restraints are
more likely to reduce social welfare when competitors cannibalize each others' sales rather
than add to overall market demand, and when the resulting market equilibrium fails to
give consumers the choice between high price/high service retailers and low price/low
service retailers).
" Complaint, FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 86-1764 14(d) (D.D.C. filed June 24, 1986).
"'Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1339-40 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) (proof fails to support a raising rivals' costs argument).
'( Rule, Merger Enforcement Policy: Protecting the Consumer, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 752-
53 (1988); see Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs toAchieve
Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 283 n.231 (1986) (quoting former Assistant Attorney
General Ginsburg); cf. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Restraints Guidelines (Feb. 14, 1985),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,105 (recognizing the possibility of anticompetitive
foreclosure but establishing stringent criteria for its proof).
17 See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J.L. & ECON. 137
(1958); R. BORK, supra note 6, at 144-55 (1978); but see R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 186
(predatory pricing is not inevitably irrational).
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to exit or acquiesce to a takeover, the subsequent monopoly price will
induce new competitors to enter. Thus, the later monopoly price will
not be high enough for long enough to make the predation enterprise
profitable.
The new economics of price predation answers the recoupment prob-
lem.' 8 When a firm predates against a few rivals, it can create a reputation
for irrationality.' Other rivals who have not experienced predatory com-
petition will now reasonably fear that if they compete strongly with the
crazy firm, it will turn and predate against them. So they back off. They
cooperate with the predator by charging a high price in their market.
The original handful of predatory episodes may be costly to the predator,
but that firm makes up its losses and more by intimidating other competi-
tors in the many markets in which no predation has occurred.
This new theory has been successfully applied to explain how turn-
of-the-century American Tobacco grew. 2° According to the empirical
evidence, the firm developed a reputation as a predator and induced the
shareholders who owned its small rivals to sell out to American Tobacco
cheaply. Even after Matsushita, '2 more stories of economically rational
price predation will appear in the courts.
III. COLLUSION WITH OCCASIONAL PRICE WARS
The third new development involves inferences arising from episodes
of price competition like price wars. Chicago-oriented antitrusters tend
"' Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165 (1987);
Roberts, Battles for Market Share: Incomplete Information, Aggressive Strategic Pricing, and Com-
petitive Dynamics, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY FIrrH WORLD CONGRESS 157 (T. Bewley
1987); Hilke & Nelson, Diversification and Predation, 37 J. INDUS. EcON. 107 (1988); Zerbe
& Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L.
REV. 655 (1982); Milgrom & Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. EcON.
THEORY 280 (1982); Kreps & Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON.
THEORY 253 (1982).
This criticism of the Chicago view was anticipated by Judge Posner, although his analysis
appeared to have little influence on his Chicago School colleagues. R. POSNER, supra note
6, at 186 (the costs of predation in one market "may generate greater deterrence benefits
in other markets").
'4 In order for the predator to develop such a reputation, its rivals must be uncertain
about the prospects for post-entry profitability. In many models, the rivals do not know the
predator's costs. E.g., Saloner, supra note 18, at 166.
21 Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. EcON. 266
(1986).
2I In this decision, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants, reversing the appellate decision. The majority concluded,
among other things, that the defendants lacked a motive to conspire because the alleged
price predation scheme was not plausible. Summaryjudgment was upheld despite plaintiff's
introduction of expert economic testimony in support of the predatory pricing allegation.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
1989]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
to interpret an industry price war as demonstrating the inherent difficulty
of enforcing collusion in that industry. But new economic models demon-
strate that occasional competitive episodes are not inconsistent with long
periods of collusive pricing.
These models presume that colluding firms have imperfect informa-
tion about the explanation for price declines: they cannot initially tell the
difference between a random decline in industry demand and a rival
cheating on their cartel. In such an industry, collusive pricing can be
maintained for a long time, punctuated by occasional episodes of in-
creased competition whenever demand declines unexpectedly.2 2 Empiri-
cal studies have identified such behavior in the railroad industry in the
nineteenth century and in the steel industry during the Great Depres-
sion. 2 Thus, while the Chicago School emphasizes that competition can
appear in many guises, 4 these models teach that collusion, too, has many
faces.
IV. MULTIMARKET CONTACT THAT FACILITATES
COLLUSIVE FORBEARANCE
Economists today are rehabilitating the old antitrust theory of con-
glomerate forbearance. This theory maintains that when conglomerates
face other conglomerate firms in a large number of markets, the con-
glomerates will compete less aggressively than single-product firms sell-
ing in the same markets. Although this argument was commonly made
before the 1970s, 5 it fell out of favor when the Chicago School rejected
all anticompetitive explanations for conglomerate mergers..2 6 But econo-
22 Green & Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMET-
RICA 87 (1984). In other models, the price wars are triggered by unexpected booms,
Rotemberg & Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms, 76 AM. EcON.
REV. 390 (1986), or by random shocks, Abreu, Pearce & Stacchetti, Optimal Cartel Equilibria
with Imperfect Monitoring, 39 J. EcON. THEORY 151 (1986). In all of these models, the
equilibrium is technically a noncooperative one in which the collusive price is obtained in
many periods. A contemporaneous observer might nevertheless describe industry behavior
as generally collusive, with occasional competitive episodes.
21 Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 415 (1985)
[hereinafter Porter, Price Wars]; Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Commit-
tee, 1880-1886, 14 BELL J. ECON. 301 (1983) [hereinafter, Porter, Cartel Stability]; Baker,
Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel Industry 1933-1939, J.L. & EcON.
(forthcoming).
21 One important Chicago School theme is that "it is virtually impossible to eliminate
competition from economic life." G. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST
164 (1985).
25 See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
340-42 (2d ed. 1980).
26 See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 246-50; cf. id. at 144-45 (a conglomerate cannot profitably
lower prices below costs in one market while avoiding the costs of predation by raising its
prices elsewhere).
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mists have now formalized rigorously the logic by which multimarket
contact may facilitate collusion. 7
The models involve firms that compete against each other in multiple
markets. These could be firms that each sell laundry detergent, tooth-
paste, and shampoo. Or they may be airlines that each serve the same
routes. These firms recognize that if they compete strongly in any one
market, their rivals may retaliate in a large number of other markets.
This threat deters cheating on a cartel, whether the interfirm agree-
ment is tacit or express. Multimarket contact induces the firms to cooper-
ate rather than compete. Accordingly, the theory of conglomerate for-
bearance is likely to return as a "plus factor" in merger analysis.
V. ENTRY BARRIERS
The fifth new development concerns entry barriers. To Judge Bork,
entry is easy unless the government creates barriers. 8 Yet economists
have recently rehabilitated the old view, questioned in Chicago, that scale
economies can create an entry barrier.2 " The new theory emphasizes the
interaction between scale economies and irreversible investments. :
A potential competitor usually undertakes new investments when it
enters a market. Perhaps it must build a plant or create a brand name
through advertising. These new investments are typically irreversible in
large part. The production equipment or brand name commonly has
little or no value in any other use.? When investments are irreversible,
expenditures on them are called sunk costs.
21 p. Woodward, Conglomerate Mergers and Tacit Collusion (Sept. 14, 1989) (unpublished
manuscript) (Dartmouth College); D. Bernheim & M. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and
Collusive Behavior, Harvard Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1317
(1987); Scott, Purposive Diversification as a Motive for Merger, 7 INT'Lj. INDUS. ORG. 35 (1989).
25 See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 195-96 (firms are unable to erect entry barriers absent
government help, although a monopolist can raise price to the limit of the superiority of
its efficiency); see id. at 178 (the market is self correcting through potential competition and
fringe expansion).
2 CompareJ. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 53-113 (1956) (scale economies may
create an entry barrier) with Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 488-89 (1985) (Chicago School
view that scale economies are not entry barriers).
." Salop, Measuring Eose of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551 (1986); Stiglitz, Technological
Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Ac-ivYr 883; Farrell,
How Effective is Potential Competition, 9 ECON. LETrERS 67 (1986); Schwartz & Reynolds,
Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM. EcON.
REV. 488 (1983). This literature grew out of the research on contestable markets. See W.
BAUMOL, J. PANZAR, & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE (1982).
"l Hence these investments cannot be recovered in a liquidation sale if the new competitor
later decides to exit.
1989]
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A rational firm will not enter a market unless it expects the post-entry
price to stay above its marginal cost long enough for it to recover its sunk
costs. When scale economies are substantial, the firm must enter at a
large scale in order to keep its marginal cost competitive with the costs
of incumbents. And when an entrant chooses a large scale, the very fact
of its entry depresses the market price," making it difficult or impossible
for it to cover its sunk costs. Thus, no matter how high the pre-entry
price, new entrants will avoid a market in which the minimum efficient
scale of production is large relative to the size of the market.3"
Moreover, this theory has been generalized and extended in the eco-
nomic literature on strategic entry deterrence. 4 If firms convince their
potential rivals that entry will lead to a competitive marketplace with a
low post-entry price, then potential competitors will refrain from entry
no matter how high the pre-entry price charged by incumbents.
To set up this threat, incumbents must make irreversible investments
in instruments of entry deterrence like excess low cost capacity, brand
proliferation, high advertising, or contract provisions by which sellers
agree to match good-faith offers by rivals. These investments are often
costly, but their expense is less than the anticompetitive profits that arise
from guaranteeing a high pre-entry price by deterring entry. Strategic
entry deterrence provides an internally consistent theory of what Judge
Bork calls an "artificial" barrier to entry.35 The new theory shows how
firms, through their own efforts, can deter entry and protect market
36power.
" Only if the incumbent sellers completely accommodate the new entry (reducing their
own output by the full amount that the entrant produces) will the new entrant's output not
lead to a reduction in the market price. See Salop, supra note 30, at 551, 563
" See id. (demonstrating the calculation of the minimum efficient scale of entry relative
to the size of the market). In a recent decision, the Federal Trade Commission concluded
that it would be difficult for an entrant to secure 5.8% of one market or 11.7% of another
market without provoking a price response from incumbent sellers. B.F. Goodrich, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,519 at 22,145 n.85, 22,146 (1988). Moreover, a very small amount
of sunk costs could be sufficient to deter new entry. Stiglitz, supra note 30, at 883.
" Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (Papers & Proceedings 1979);
Smiley, Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence, 6 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 167 (1988)
(surveyed firms report that these practices are prevalent).
35 R. BORK, supra note 6, at 311.
:" The main theme of the literature on strategic entry deterrence is that incumbent firms
can convince prospective entrants that entry will be unprofitable by ensuring that incumbent
marginal costs are low. (Low incumbent costs guarantee that the competitive, post-entry
price will be low.) In some models of entry deterrence, however, incumbents convince
potential competitors that entry will not be profitable through alternative routes: incum-
bents deceive entrants into believing that market demand is low or that entrant costs are
high. Scharfstein, A Policy to Prevent Rational Test-Market Predation, 15 RANDJ. EcON. 229
(1984); Fudenberg & Tirole, A 'Signal-Jamming' Theory of Predation, 17 RANDJ. ECON. 366
(1986).
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VI. NEW EMPIRICAL TOOLS
The "new empirical industrial organization" literature is the final new
development. In the past decade, empirical economists have created
innovative methodologies for asking a variety of questions related to
whether individual firms are exercising market power."' Do firms act as
though they expect their rivals to cooperate or to compete?"" When firm-
specific costs rise, forcing a seller to reduce output, is it able to raise
price?3 9 Does a firm selling a product line obtain as high a markup for
those of its products with direct competition as for "orphan" products
that its rivals do not sell? 40 How do firm revenues increase in proportion
to an across-the-board rise in input prices?41 When demand declines
unexpectedly, do firms respond by acting more competitively, as though
they think they are policing a cartel?42 When the demand function it
faces grows steeper, does a firm reduce output and increase price?4
As a group, the recent studies demonstrate that a great deal of market
power exists in some concentrated industries. 4 They support the view
that a kinder, gentler nation needs a tougher, meaner antitrust law.
Government enforcers will likely earn the biggest payoff from these new
17 The older empirical tradition in industrial organization economics was primarily con-
cerned with making broad cross-industry generalizations about the relationship between
measures of industry structure (like concentration) and prices or profits. In contrast,
the newer studies typically exploit recent advances in economic theory and econometric
methodology to examine the behavior of individual firms or single industries. See generally,
Bresnahan & Schmalensee, The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics: An Overview,
35J. INDUs. EcoN. 371 (1987).
3" E.g., Iwata, Measurement of Conjectural Variations in Oligopoly, 42 ECONOMETRICA 947
(1974); Gelfand & Spiller, Entry Barriers and Multiproduct Oligopolies, 5 1NT'L J. I N DUS. ORG.
101 (1987).
" Baker & Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 6 INT'L
J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988). This econometric technique for identifying the market power
of a firm or group of firms has been applied to implement empirically the market definition
algorithm of the current Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines. Scheffman & Spiller,
Geographic Market Definition Under the DOJ Guidelines, 30 J.L. & ECON. 123 (1987); J. Baker,
Why Price Correlations Do Not Define Antitrust Markets: On Econometric Algorithms for Market
Definition (Working Paper No. 149, FTC Bureau of Economics 1987).
"' Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price
War, 35J. INDus. EcoN. 457 (1987).
" Panzar & Rosse, Testing for "Monopoly" Equilibrium, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 443 (1987).
12 Porter, Price Wars, supra note 23, at 415; Porter, Cartel Stability, supra note 23; Baker,
supra note 23.
" Bresnahan, The Oligopoly Solution Concept Is Identified, 10 ECON. LETTERS 87 (1982); cf.
Suslow, Estimating Monopoly Behavior with Competitive Recycling: An Application to Alcoa, 17
RANDJ. EcoN. 389 (1986) (inferring market power from estimates of the structural demand
curve, the marginal cost function, and the competitive interaction).
" Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig, forthcoming); Schmalensee, Industrial Econom-
ics: An Overview, 98 EcON. J. 643, 668 (1988).
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econometric techniques. The new tools offer a new way to identify poorly
performing industries and select good antitrust cases.45
These new empirical tools emphasize that competition is localized in
product-differentiated industries. For example, one study found that
Budweiser could have obtained market power by merging with Pabst in
the 1970s, without any cooperation from Miller, Stroh, or Coors.46 The
explanation for this result takes product differentiation seriously. Al-
though many Budweiser drinkers would have switched to Miller if the
Budweiser price rose, a substantial number of Budweiser drinkers appar-
ently had Pabst as their second choice and no close third choice. These
drinkers would have substituted Pabst if the Budweiser price rose. But
they had no good alternative except to pay the higher Budweiser price
if Budweiser first acquired Pabst and kept their second choice brand
from increasing output.
If this study is correct, the Budweiser-Pabst brand pair formed a sub-
market during the 1970s. This small collection of products satisfied the
market definition test of the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.47
But it is difficult to imagine a Chicago-oriented judge or enforcer includ-
ing Budweiser and Pabst in a product market without Miller. However
justified,4 8 a Budweiser-Pabst submarket sounds like a bad dream from
the 1960s, not a market defined in Chicago. To avoid narrow submarkets
while still taking localized competition into account to some degree,
judges and enforcers could treat econometric evidence that the merging
brands lack close substitutes within a market as a "plus factor" making
15 Because these techniques promise to improve the ability of courts and enforcers to
distinguish anticompetitive practices from efficient ones, they address the Chicago School's
concern that the government cannot reliably improve market functioning.
'1 Baker & Bresnahan, The Gainsfrom Mergeror Collusion in Product-Differentiated Industries,
33J. INDUS. ECON. 427 (1985).
Another study found that a Coke-Dr Pepper merger would have allowed Coca-Cola to
raise price regardless of competition from Pepsi. See Reinstadtler, The Economics of Merger
in Product-Differentiated Industries: A Framework for Analyzing Merger Activity in the
Soft Drink Industry (Master's Thesis, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, May 1987); cf. Complaint, FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 86-1764 14(a)
(D.D.C. filed June 24, 1986) (proposed merger alleged likely to lessen competition by
eliminating "direct competition" between Coca-Cola and Dr Pepper). The Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division have reportedly undertaken similar studies to
identify the elimination of localized competition in mergers involving branded consumer
products.
17 Anheuser-Busch would likely have been able to raise the price of Budweiser by more
than 5% were it to merge with Pabst. See Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 46, at 440-41.
'1 Unless courts define narrow submarkets when competition is localized in product-
differentiated industries, they run the risk of allowing anticompetitive mergers when
broader markets are not concentrated. A brewing industry merger, for example, is more
likely to generate close scrutiny if its competitive effects are assessed in a Budweiser-Pabst
submarket than if they are examined within the less concentrated beer market.
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challenges to mergers and prohibitions in product-differentiated indus-
tries more likely.4 9
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the past fifteen years, the courts and enforcement agencies have
created Robert Bork's antitrust paradise. Antitrust has adopted the Chi-
cago School's efficiency analysis and the Chicago School's conclusions
about the effects of business practices. But good economic analysis does
not make all the old antitrust disappear. There are sound economic
cases challenging vertical practices as well as horizontal ones. Predation,
foreclosure, and conglomerate forbearance can be as harmful as bid-
rigging and collusion.
The Chicago School has rebuilt antitrust on a foundation of economics.
But antitrust can adopt an economic methodology without accepting the
Chicago School's interpretation of every business practice. As economic
theory develops and new empirical tools are created, antitrust interpreta-
tion will evolve beyond the Chicago School's views.
" This approach is suggested by the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103.
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